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Abstract— The STCP (Stream Control Transmission Protocol) 
is a candidate for a new transport layer protocol that may 
replace the TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) and the UDP 
(User Datagram Protocol) protocols in future IP networks. 
Currently, the SCTP is implemented in, or can be added to, 
many popular operating systems (Windows, BSD, Linux, HP-
UX or Sun Solaris). This paper identifies and presents all 
possible “places” where hidden information can be exchanged 
using an SCTP. The paper focuses mostly on proposing new 
steganographic methods that can be applied to an SCTP and 
that can utilise new, characteristic SCTP features, such as 
multi-homing and multi-streaming. Moreover, for each 
method, the countermeasure is covered. When used with 
malicious intent, a method may pose a threat to network 
security. Knowledge about potential SCTP steganographic 
methods may be used as a supplement to RFC5062, which 
describes security attacks in an SCTP protocol. Presented in 
this paper is a complete analysis of information hiding in an 
SCTP, and this analysis can be treated as a “guide” when 
developing steganalysis (detection) tools. 
Keywords: steganography, information hiding, SCTP 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Steganographic techniques have been used for millennia 
and date back to ancient Greece [4]. The aim of 
steganographic communication in ancient times and in 
modern applications is the same: hide secret data 
(steganogram) in innocent-looking cover material and send it 
to the proper recipient, who is aware of the information 
hiding procedure. In an ideal situation, the existence of the 
hidden communication cannot be detected by third parties. 
What distinguishes historical steganographic methods from 
modern ones is, in fact, only the form of the cover (carrier) 
for secret data. Historical methods used human skin, wax 
tablets or letters, or other media. Today, steganographic 
methods use digital media such as pictures, audio, or video, 
which are transmitted using telecommunication networks. A 
recent trend in steganography is the utilisation of network 
protocols as a steganogram carrier by modifying content of 
the packets, modifying time relations between packets, or 
using a hybrid solution. All of the information hiding 
methods that may be used to exchange steganograms in 
telecommunication networks are described by the term 
network steganography, which was originally introduced by 
Szczypiorski in 2003 [8]. Many steganographic methods 
have been proposed and analysed, e.g., [1]-[4]. These 
methods should be treated as a threat to network security, 
because they may cause the leakage of confidential 
information. Steganography as a network threat was 
marginalised for a few years [20]; however, now not only 
security staff but also business and consulting firms are 
becoming continuously aware of the potential dangers and 
possibilities it creates [10]. 
Knowledge of the information hiding procedure is 
helpful to develop countermeasures. Therefore, it is 
important to identify potential, previously unknown 
possibilities for covert communication. Such identification is 
especially important when new network protocols are 
forecasted to be widely deployed in future networks. For 
example, detailed analyses of information hiding methods in 
the IPv6 protocol header were presented by Lucena et al. [9]. 
In the present paper, we perform similar analyses, except for 
the use of the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) 
[5]. The SCTP is a transport layer protocol and its main role 
is similar to two popular protocols, the Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) and the User Datagram Protocol (UDP). The 
SCTP provides some of the same service features of both, 
ensuring reliable, in-sequence transport of messages with 
congestion control. Certain advantages make SCTP a 
candidate for a transport protocol in future IP networks; the 
main advantages are that the SCTP is multi-streaming and 
multi-homing. The popularity of the SCTP is still growing, 
but it has already been deployed in many important operating 
systems, such as BSD, Linux (the most popular is lksctp 
[13]), HP-UX, and Sun Solaris. SCTP is supported by the 
Cisco network device operating system (Cisco IOS) and can 
even be run in Windows if the proper library is installed [11]. 
To the best of our knowledge, there are no 
steganographic methods proposed for the SCTP protocol. 
However, information hiding methods that have been 
proposed for the TCP and the UDP protocols (e.g., utilising 
free/unused or not strictly standard-defined fields) may be 
utilised in the SCTP as well, due to several similarities 
between these transport layer protocols and the SCTP. 
Steganographic methods for TCP and UDP protocols were 
described by Rowland [1] and by Murdoch and Lewis [2], 
and very good surveys on hidden communication can be 
found in Zander et al. [3] and Petitcolas et al. [4].  
The main contribution of this paper is to identify and 
present all possible “places” where hidden information can 
be exchanged i.e. the whole landscape for the SCTP 
protocol. This task also includes the identification and 
presentation of the simplest steganographic methods, e.g., 
those that substitute the content of certain SCTP header 
fields, as these methods have been well known for years, 
given the state of the art. Moreover, even the simplest 
methods can sometimes be successfully utilised because of 
ambiguous standardisation, which affects later 
implementations. For example, padding in Ethernet frames 
should always be set to zeros, but due to a well-known 
Etherleak [21] effect, more than 20% of Ethernet frames 
have padding filled with random data [18]. This phenomenon 
can be utilised to mask hidden communications, even for 
simple steganographic methods that insert steganograms into 
padding. In typical cases, such methods will always be easily 
detectable. 
However, the main focus in this paper is on proposing 
new steganographic methods that utilise new, characteristic 
SCTP features, such as multi-homing and multi-streaming. 
When used with malicious intentions, steganographic 
methods can become perfect tools to launch network attacks. 
Thus, knowledge about such SCTP-based information hiding 
solutions can be used as a supplement to RFC5062 [12], 
which describes security attacks in SCTP protocols and 
current countermeasures. However, RFC5062 does not 
include any information about steganography-based attacks 
and methods of preventing them.  
For the vast majority of the presented steganographic 
methods, modification to the SCTP standard is enough to 
limit their effectiveness. Proposed in this paper, SCTP-
specific steganographic methods can be divided into two 
groups [18]: 
• Intra-protocol methods, which may be further divided 
into the following methods: 1) Modify the content of 
the SCTP packets, 2) Modify how the SCTP packets 
are exchanged, and 3) Modify both the content of the 
SCTP and the way the packets are exchanged, i.e., 
hybrid methods. 
• Inter-protocol methods, which utilise relationships 
between two or more different network protocols to 
enable secret communication (in our case, the 
proposed method utilises SCTP and IP protocols).  
 
The above classification is also presented in Fig. 1 and 
will be used throughout the paper to describe and analyse the 
proposed SCTP-based steganographic methods. This work is 
an extension of our previous work [19]. 
 
 
Figure 1.Classification of SCTP-specific steganographic 
methods (the number of the proposed steganographic methods 
for each category is put into brackets) 
 
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. 
Section 2 gives a brief overview of the SCTP protocol. In 
Section 3, intra-protocol steganography methods that adopt 
characteristics of the SCTP protocol are presented. In 
Section 4, a new inter-protocol method that utilises SCTP is 
proposed. Section 5 provides possible detection and 
elimination solutions for the proposed methods. In Section 6, 
the implementation of one of the proposed methods is 
described. The methodology of an experiment based on the 
implemented method is explained in Section 7. Section 8 
provides experimental results and analysis. Finally, Section 9 
concludes our work. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE SCTP PROTOCOL 
The SCTP [5] was defined by the IETF Signalling 
Transport (SIGTRAN) working group in 2000 and is 
maintained by the IETF Transport Area (TSVWG) working 
group. It was developed for one specific reason - the 
transportation of telephony signalling over IP-based 
networks. However, its features make it capable of being a 
general purpose transport layer protocol ([5], [6]). 
SCTP, like TCP, provides reliable in-sequence data 
transport with congestion control, but it also eliminates the 
limitations of TCP, which are increasingly onerous in many 
applications. SCTP also allows users to set order-of-arrival 
delivery of the data, which means that the data are delivered 
to the upper layer as soon as they are received (a sequence 
number is of no significance). Unordered transmission can 
be set for all messages or for only some of the messages, 
depending on the application needs.  
The SCTP Partial Reliability Extension, defined in [7], is 
a mechanism that allows users to send only some of the data 
if all are not necessary, i.e., the data that were not correctly 
received but became out-of-date. The decision to not 
transmit some data is made by the sender. He/she has to 
inform the receiver that some data will not be sent, and the 
receiver should treat these data as though they had been 
correctly received and acknowledged. The Partial Reliability 
Extension and the order-of-arrival delivery enable the use of 
the SCTP in many applications that are now using UDP. 
In TCP, all data are sent as a stream of bytes with no 
boundaries between messages. This behaviour requires that 
TCP-based applications have to conduct message framing 
and must provide a buffer for incomplete messages from the 
TCP agent. In SCTP, data is sent as separate messages 
passed by the upper layer. This feature makes SCTP-based 
applications easier to develop than TCP-based ones. 
Each SCTP connection (called association in SCTP) can 
use one or more streams, which are unidirectional logical 
channels between SCTP endpoints. Order-of-transmission 
or order-of-arrival delivery of data are both performed 
within each stream separately and not globally. If one of the 
streams is blocked (i.e. a packet is lost and the receiver is 
waiting for the packet), this blockage does not affect other 
streams. The benefit of using multiple streams is illustrated 
in Fig. 2.  
As shown in Fig. 2, User X sends four messages (A, B, 
C, and D) to user Y. There are two requirements concerning 
the delivery order of these messages. Message A must be 
delivered before message B, and message C must be 
delivered before message D. In TCP, messages are sent in 
the following order: A, B, C, and D, as shown in Fig. 2(1). 
If message A is lost, as shown in Fig. 2(2), other messages, 
in spite of the correct reception, cannot be dispatched to the 
upper layer until message A is retransmitted and 
successfully received by user Y, shown in Fig. 2(3). In 
SCTP, using multi-streaming, messages can be divided into 
two streams. Messages A and B can be sent within Stream 
1, and Messages C and D can be sent within Stream 2, as 
shown in Fig. 2(4). If message A is lost, as shown in Fig. 
2(5), only message B cannot be passed to the upper layer 
until message A is received. Messages C and D can be 
delivered to the upper layer, since they are sent within 
different streams compared to Messages A and B, shown in 
Fig. 2(6).  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Comparison of TCP and SCTP data transport using 
multiple streams 
 
Another SCTP feature is a provision for protocol 
extensibility. Each SCTP packet consists of a main header 
and one or more chunks, as shown in Fig. 3. There are two 
types of chunks: data chunks that contain user data, and 
control chunks that are used to control data transfer. Each 
chunk consists of fields and parameters specific to the chunk 
type, shown in Fig. 4. Fields are mandatory, and parameters 
can be either mandatory or optional. SCTP packet structure 
allows defining not only new chunk types but also 
broadening functionality of the existing chunk types through 
defining new parameters. 
 
Common header
Chunk #1
Chunk #2
...
Chunk #n
 
Figure 3. SCTP packet format 
 
Parameter type Parameter length
Parameter value
Chunk type Chunk flags Chunk length
Chunk value
 
Figure 4. SCTP chunks and parameters format 
 
SCTP supports multi-homing, i.e., the host’s ability to be 
visible in the network through more than one IP address, for 
instance, if the host is equipped with a few NICs (Network 
Interface Cards). Multi-homing in an SCTP is used to 
provide increased reliability of data transfer. If there are no 
packet losses, all messages are transmitted using one source 
address and one destination address (primary path). If a 
chunk is retransmitted, the chunk should be sent using a 
different path (different source and destination addresses) 
compared to the primary path. Another advantage of SCTP 
multi-homing in SCTP is the ability to do failover data 
transfer if the primary path is down. 
SCTP uses a four-way handshake with a cookie (Fig. 5), 
which provides protection against a synchronisation attack 
(a type of Denial of Service attack); this type of attack is 
known from TCP implementations. In SCTP, the user 
initiates an association with the INIT chunk. In response, 
he/she receives the INIT ACK chunk with a cookie 
(containing the information that identifies a proposed 
connection). Then, he/she replies with a COOKIE ECHO, 
with a copy of the received cookie. Reception of this chunk 
is acknowledged with the COOKIE ACK chunk. After 
successful reception of COOKIE ACK, the association is 
established. Afterwards, connected users can send data 
using DATA chunks and can acknowledge reception of 
them with SACK chunks. 
 
 
Figure 5.SCTP association establishment 
 
Aside from the features described, SCTP also provides a 
built-in path MTU (Maximum Transmission Unit) 
discovery, a data fragmentation mechanism; in general, 
SCTP is considered more secure than TCP. 
III. THE PROPOSED INTRA-PROTOCOL METHODS 
A. Methods that modify the content of SCTP packets 
As mentioned above, each SCTP packet consists of 
chunks, and each chunk can contain variable parameters. We 
propose 13 new steganographic methods that modify the 
content of SCTP packets using the following chunks and 
parameters: 
• INIT and INIT ACK chunks – used during 
initialisation of SCTP association (methods I1, I2), 
• DATA chunks – which contain user data (methods 
D1, D2), 
• SACK chunks – used to acknowledge received 
DATA chunks (methods S1, S2), 
• AUTH chunk – used to authenticate chunks (method 
A1), 
• PAD chunk – used to pad packets (method P1), 
• Variable parameters – used in specific chunks 
(methods VP1-5). 
 
These steganographic methods are presented in detail, as 
follows. 
 
A.1 INIT and INIT ACK chunks 
(I1) Initiate Tag is a 32-bit value of the Verification Tag 
field. This tag must be inserted into each SCTP packet, 
which is sent to the originator of INIT or INIT ACK chunks 
within this association. The Initiate Tag can be any value 
except 0 and thus may be used for steganographic purposes, 
as shown in Fig. 6. The maximum bandwidth of this channel 
is 32 bits/chunk (fewer bits of this field should be used to 
limit the chance of detection). 
 
 
Figure 6.Method based on the Initiate Tag field 
 
(I2) Number of Inbound Streams is a 16-bit field that 
defines the maximum number of inbound streams that the 
sender of the INIT or INIT ACK can handle within this 
association. In most cases, using more than one hundred 
streams is unlikely; as a result, at least a few of the most 
significant bits can be used to insert hidden data. To limit the 
risk of detection, not only the most significant bits may be 
used. The potential bandwidth of this method is 8 bits/chunk. 
A.2 DATA chunks 
(D1) Stream Sequence Number (SSN) is a 16-bit 
sequence number within each stream. If the order-of-arrival 
delivery of the data is set, then there are no requirements 
concerning the SSN. This feature makes it possible to use the 
SSN to send steganograms. The maximum bandwidth of this 
channel is 16 bits/chunk. The method presented can be 
utilised only if an unordered transmission is set for all data 
within a stream.  
(D2) Payload Protocol Identifier is a 32-bit field that 
represents an upper layer protocol identifier. This field is not 
used by an SCTP agent because it is for purposes of upper 
layer protocols. The value 0 indicates no identifier, and other 
values should be standardised with IANA. SCTP does not 
verify this value, so it can be used to send secret data. The 
maximum bandwidth of this channel is 32 bits/chunk. 
 
A.3 SACK chunks 
(S1) Advertised Receiver Window Credit is a 32-bit field 
that indicates the current size of the SACK sender’s receiver 
buffer. A few least significant bits of this field can be utilised 
for steganographic purposes. Potential bandwidth of this 
method is 3-4 bits/chunk; the bandwidth cannot be higher 
because a higher value could affect flow control. 
(S2) Duplicate TSNs, which are part of the SACK chunk, 
are sequence numbers of the duplicate chunks that have been 
received. This mechanism may enable hidden 
communication through adding non-duplicating chunk TSNs 
to the list of duplicate TSNs. In spite of 32 bits of length in 
the TSN, potential steganographic bandwidth is only a few 
bits per chunk. This is because adding very different TSNs 
from recently sent is easy to detect. The method presented 
here is harder to detect if it is used by multi-homed hosts 
because it might send SACK chunks with duplicates to 
addresses other than the source address of the DATA 
chunks. 
A.4 AUTH chunks 
(A1) Shared Key Identifier is a 16-bit field that indicates 
which pair of shared keys is used in the chunk. This field can 
be used for covert communication because the receiver of the 
packet can authenticate the sender through checking all 
previously exchanged shared keys. The potential 
steganographic bandwidth of this channel is 1-4 bits/chunk 
because, in most cases, there will not be many shared keys 
available. Detection of this method is quite hard because 
shared keys are established outside of the SCTP protocol. 
A.5 PAD chunks 
(P1) Padding Data is a field whose length depends on 
padding needs. There are no requirements concerning the 
value of this field, so it can be used for covert 
communication. Thus, steganographic bandwidth of this 
channel depends on the size of the padding data. 
A.6 Variable Parameters 
(VP1) IPv4 Address in IPv4 Address Parameter and IPv6 
Address in IPv6 Address Parameter contain addresses of the 
sending endpoints. These parameters are used for multi-
homed hosts and can be attached to INIT, INIT ACK and 
ASCONF (used to dynamic address reconfiguration) chunks. 
Each address in these parameters is considered to be 
unconfirmed until its reachability is not checked. This 
behaviour allows the use of these parameters for 
steganographic purposes by sending secret data instead of 
sending an IP address. However, usage of this method may 
lead to aborting the association when existing IP addresses 
are used. The maximum bandwidth is 32 bits/parameter for 
the IPv4 address and 128 bits/parameter for the IPv6 address. 
(VP2) Heartbeat Info Parameter is used in the 
HEARTBEAT chunk, which is exploited to verify 
reachability of the destination addresses. Heartbeat Info 
Parameter contains the Sender-Specific Heartbeat Info field, 
whose content is not defined, so it can be used as a 
steganogram carrier. The size of the Sender-Specific 
Heartbeat Info field may differ for various SCTP 
implementations, which means that the steganographic 
bandwidth for this method is also implementation dependent. 
In the Linux Kernel Stream Control Transmission Protocol 
(lksctp-2.6.28-1.0.10) implementation of SCTP, the Sender-
Specific Heartbeat Info field has 40 bytes, and thus the 
steganographic bandwidth for this method is about 320 
bits/chunk. 
TABLE I.  SUMMARY OF VARIOUS METHODS’ POTENTIAL 
STEGANOGRAP
HIC 
BANDWIDTH  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(VP3) Random Number in Random Parameter can also 
be used for covert communication. Steganographic 
bandwidth of this method depends on the purpose of the 
number. If the number is used in an authentication process, 
then the random number has 32 bytes and is sent in INIT or 
INIT ACK chunks. As result, the maximum steganographic 
bandwidth is 32 bytes/chunk. 
(VP4) ASCONF-Request Correlation ID in Add IP 
Address Parameter, Delete IP Address Parameter and Set 
Primary Address Parameter is a 32-bit field that identifies 
each request. The only requirement concerning its value is 
that it be unique for each request; thus, it may be used to 
transfer steganograms. The maximum steganographic 
bandwidth of this method is 32 bits/parameter.  
(VP5) Padding Data in Padding Parameter can be 
exploited for covert communication in the same way as 
Padding Data in Padding chunk (see method P1). Padding 
Parameter can be used only in the INIT chunk. 
 
B. Methods that modify how SCTP packets are exchanged 
 
B.1 MULTI-STREAMING 
In SCTP, multi-streaming (for ordered delivery) is 
realised by utilising two identifiers: Stream Identifier (SI) to 
uniquely mark the stream, and Stream Sequence Number 
(SSN) to ensure the correct order of packets at the receiver. 
Despite these two identifiers, each DATA chunk contains 
also Transmission Sequence Number (TSN), which is 
assigned independently to each chunk. 
A steganographic method that adopts multi-streaming is 
based on a determined assignment of TSNs for every chunk 
distributed along different streams. SIs in subsequent DATA 
chunks will represent hidden data bits. The example for this 
method is presented in Fig. 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Multi-streaming based steganographic method 
 
At initialisation phase of the SCTP association, users 
negotiate a number of utilised streams (in the example there 
are 4 streams). Each stream is assigned with binary 
sequences shown in Fig. 7(1) – from ‘00’ to ‘11’. Sending 
the data through a certain stream depends on the 
steganogram bits. Therefore, if User X wants to secretly 
transfer the ‘1011’ bit sequence, then he/she would first send 
data through Stream 3, then through Stream 4, as shown in 
Fig. 7(2). It is worth noting that the actual time of the packet 
arrival is not essential to the correct reception of the secret 
message. The order of the chunks is determined by the TSN 
number. 
To send steganograms using the proposed steganographic 
method, it is possible to use not only single chunks but also 
groups of chunks. Thus, there are sk ways to send k chunks 
using s streams. The maximum steganographic bandwidth 
SMB-MS for this method may be expressed as 
 
  (3-1) 
 
According to Eq. (3-1), the maximum steganographic 
bandwidth is independent of the size of the chunks’ group 
used to hide bits. However, the number of bits actually sent 
may be different for various sizes of groups. This difference 
is caused by the fact that the maximum bandwidth may not 
be a natural number. The greatest influence on the real 
bandwidth has entier of , and the fractional part is 
less significant. The lower bound of the steganographic 
bandwidth of this method can be expressed as 
 
  (3-2) 
 
Steganographic 
method 
Steganographic 
bandwidth Units 
I1 32 bits/chunk 
I2 8 bits/chunk 
D1 16 bits/chunk 
D2 32 bits/chunk 
S1 3-4 bits/chunk 
S2 3-4 bits/chunk 
A1 1-4 bits/chunk 
P1 varies n/a 
VP1 32 bits/par. 
VP2 320 bits/chunk 
VP3 32 bits/chunk 
VP4 32 bits/par. 
VP5 varies n/a 
If we assume that the number of streams is 3 and that 
single chunks are used to hide bits of steganogram, one of 
three values may be assigned to each chunk, for example, 
“0”, “1”, “00”. Then, the lower bound of the steganographic 
bandwidth equals 1 bit/chunk ( ). This is because it 
is certain that only “0” or “1” can be sent every time, and the 
sending of “00” depends on bits of steganogram. If we 
consider chunk groups of size two, then one of nine values 
can be assigned to each group; as a result, the lower bound of 
the steganographic bandwidth equals 1.5 bits/chunk 
( ). 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Multi-streaming based steganographic method – using 
chunk groups to hide bits 
 
The example of using chunk groups is presented in Fig. 
8. At the initialisation phase of the SCTP association, users 
negotiate a number of utilised streams (in the example there 
are 3 streams). In addition, chunk groups are set to a size of 
2. At the bottom of Fig. 8, the lookup table, with values 
assigned to possible chunk groups, is shown. If User X wants 
to secretly convey the bit sequence “001101”, he/she first 
sends chunks within Streams 1 and 2, then within Streams 2 
and 3. 
For example, if we assume that the overt communication 
rate is 250 packets/s, each packet has only one chunk with 
data and 4 streams are used; then, the steganographic 
bandwidth is 500 bits/s. 
 
B.2 CHUNK-BASED FORMAT OF PACKETS 
As mentioned above, each SCTP packet consists of a 
main header and one or more chunks. This structure allows 
the sending of a steganogram through the manipulation of 
messages that are to be transmitted. 
The first method, which utilises the modular structure of 
SCTP packets, modifies the order in which the chunks are to 
be sent. Each predetermined sequence of chunks may 
indicate certain steganogram bits. However, this method is 
limited by two main constraints on the order of chunks in the 
SCTP packet: 
• Control chunks must be placed before DATA 
chunks. 
• DATA chunks must be sent in the order of 
increasing TSNs. 
The result is that only the order of the control chunks 
may be used for steganographic purposes. The most 
frequently sent control chunk is SACK, but its broad set of 
features implies that there is no need to transmit more than 
one SACK in a single packet. Other control chunks are rarely 
sent; as a result, the bandwidth of this method is usually less 
than 1 bit/s. However, if the constraints listed are not 
considered, then the steganographic bandwidth of this 
method will increase. 
The second method, which uses a chunk-based format for 
SCTP packets, hides bits in the number of chunks in a single 
packet. For example, let us assume that a packet consists of a 
maximum of four chunks. In that case, a packet with one 
chunk may indicate the bit sequence “00” and a packet with 
two chunks “01”, etc. 
The steganographic bandwidth for this method can be 
expressed as 
 
  (3-3) 
 
where MTUdata denotes the value of MTU reduced by the 
size of the headers of SCTP and the lower layer protocols, 
and r is the size of a chunk. 
For example, if we assume that MTU equals 1400 bytes, 
and the size of each chunk is 200 bytes, then the bandwidth 
of this method is about 2.8 bits/chunk. If we additionally 
assume that the overt communication rate is 250 packets/s, 
then the steganographic bandwidth is about 700 bits/s. 
 
C. Hybrid methods 
The SCTP partial reliability extension was also proposed 
by Stewart et al. [7]. This extension allows the system to not 
retransmit certain data despite the fact that the data was not 
successfully received. This construct is possible through the 
FORWARD TSN (FT) chunk, where a new 
acknowledgement of TSN is inserted. After receiving such a 
message, the receiving side treats the missing chunks with 
equal or lower TSNs, as they were properly delivered. This 
functionality may be adopted for steganographic purposes.  
The idea of the first proposed method is similar to the 
concept of LACK (Lost Audio Packets Steganography), 
which was developed for real-time multimedia services by 
Mazurczyk and Szczypiorski [14].  
The main idea of this method is presented in Fig. 9. From 
the User X data, the chunk sent with TSN 6 is skipped, and 
into this chunk the steganogram is inserted (1). Next, User X 
sends an FT chunk to signal a new acknowledgment of the 
TSN (2). After successful reception of an FT chunk, User Y 
issues a SACK chunk with a new acknowledgment of the 
TSN (3). When User X receives the SACK chunk, he/she 
can send an omitted DATA chunk with a steganogram (4). 
Presented behaviour may look suspicious for many 
applications, which is why this steganographic method 
should be used in applications that frequently send large 
messages. 
 
User X User Y
User YUser X
User YUser X
48 7 5
FT: 8
ACK: 8
User X User Y
6Steganogram
6
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
 
Figure 9. First hybrid SCTP steganographic method 
 
If we assume that the covert communication rate is 250 
packets/s, each packet has only one chunk, with a payload 
size of 1000 bytes. If we use 0.01% of the packets to insert a 
steganogram, then the potential steganographic bandwidth is 
200 bits/s. 
The idea of the second method is presented in Fig. 10. 
 
 
Figure 10. Second hybrid SCTP steganographic method 
 
User X is to send messages A and B. Both messages are 
too large to put into a single packet, so they are fragmented 
(message A into chunks with TSNs of 3, 4, and 5, and 
message B into chunks with TSNs of 6, and 7). Message B 
should not contain user data and can be inserted intentionally 
to send the steganogram. User X puts the steganogram into 
chunks with TSN 7 and sends the chunks with TSN 3, 4, 5, 
and 7 (without the chunk with TSN 6) to User Y. Then, User 
X sends the FT chunks to signal a new acknowledgment to 
the TSN. After User Y receives the FT chunk, he/she 
analyses chunks in the buffer and finds part of an incomplete 
message (chunk with TSN 7), which contains a steganogram. 
If we assume that the covert communication rate is 250 
packets/s, then the size of the messages generated by the user 
is 2800 bytes (forcing fragmentation into two chunks of 1400 
bytes each). We use 0.01% of the packets to insert the 
steganogram. As a result, the potential steganographic 
bandwidth is 280 bits/s. 
 
IV. THE PROPOSED INTER-PROTOCOL SCTP-BASED 
METHOD 
The SCTP multi-homing feature can be utilised to 
perform hidden communications. The main idea of the 
proposed steganographic method is presented in Fig. 11. 
Two users establish SCTP association (User 1 and User 2), 
and each of them is equipped with more than one NIC. The 
primary path for the users’ communication is through 
interfaces A and X (1). If n1 denotes the number of the 
alternative senders’ NIC addresses (in Fig. 11 there are 2), 
and n2 represents the number of alternative receiver NIC 
addresses (in Fig. 11 also 2), then each address can be used 
to represent one steganogram bit (or a sequence of bits). 
Possible alternative paths for communication between these 
users are as follows: BY, BZ, CY and CZ. User 1’s B 
interface IP address represents binary ‘0’, and the C interface 
IP address represents binary ‘1’ (a similar situation occurs 
for User 2). Assigning the bits or the sequences of bits to the 
users' NICs may depend on the IP address values, i.e., the 
available NIC addresses can be sorted from the lowest to the 
highest, and then consecutive values (bit sequences) can be 
assigned.  
If User 1 wants to send a steganogram, then he/she waits 
for the transmission error on the primary path to occur and 
then retransmits a chunk through the appropriate path. For 
example, in Fig. 11, if User 1 wants to send a steganogram 
that consists of the sequence ‘01’, he/she waits for the 
transmission error on the primary path to occur (1) and sends 
retransmitted packets through path BZ (2). Before sending a 
steganogram, it should first be established which 
retransmitted chunks carry hidden data. Users can assume 
that all retransmissions carry bits of steganogram or should 
mark the beginning of a hidden communication, for example, 
with an initiation sequence (a sequence of retransmitted 
chunks through paths that were agreed on previously). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Multi-homing based steganographic method 
 
If retransmitted chunks (retransmission is a SCTP 
feature) are sent using alternative paths (multi-homing 
mechanisms available in SCTP), then proper IP addresses 
must be set in an IP packet. The above-mentioned features of 
the presented method cause the property that the method’s 
functioning is not limited to only the SCTP protocol. Instead, 
this method is an example of inter-protocol steganography 
that utilises relationships between SCTP and IP protocols. 
Steganographic bandwidth SB-MH for this method can be 
expressed as 
 
  (4-1) 
 
 
For example, in Fig. 10, if the SCTP packet rate is 250 
packets/s, assume that each packet contains only a single 
data chunk and that the retransmission rate is 2% (the 
retransmission rate of the Internet is up to 5%), then 
achieved steganographic bandwidth is 10 bits/s. 
In a similar way, multi-homing can be used for covert 
communication in the reverse direction (from User 2 to User 
1). To accomplish this goal, SACK chunks with duplicate 
TSNs should be used. 
V. DETECTION POSSIBILITIES 
For each of the groups of steganographic methods 
proposed in Section 3, detection or elimination solutions are 
sketched. Most of the proposed methods can be detected by 
comparing suspicious traffic to SCTP specifications or to 
statistics of non-steganographic SCTP traffic, as shown in 
Fig. 12. The main aim of this section is to point out potential 
enhancements that may be applied to SCTP standards to 
alleviate steganography utilisation, ideally at the standard 
development stage. Therefore, proposed countermeasures 
should be treated as guidelines for standard improvements. 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Detection and elimination of steganogram  
 
A. Methods that modify the content of SCTP packets 
For steganographic methods that utilise modification to 
the SCTP packet content, possible detection techniques and 
proposed countermeasures are depicted in Table II. 
 
TABLE II.  POSSIBLE STANDARD IMPROVEMENTS TO NEUTRALISE 
STEGANOGRAPHIC METHODS THAT MODUFY CONTENT OF SCTP PACKETS 
 
B. Methods that modify how SCTP packets are exchanged 
 
B.1 MULTI-STREAMING 
Similar to the multi-homing based steganographic 
method, detection of multi-streaming may be hard to perform 
and depends on the concrete application with which the 
SCTP will be utilised. If the pattern of stream usage is 
established, then statistical SCTP traffic analysis may reveal 
hidden communication.  
Elimination of the proposed steganographic method may 
be achieved by changing TSNs by an intermediate node, e.g., 
an edge router with steganography detection functionality. 
Such operation may successfully interrupt the proper 
exchange of hidden data.  
 
B.2 CHUNK-BASED FORMAT OF PACKETS 
Detection of the first-described method based on 
influencing the chunk-based format of the packet may be 
hard to perform if constraints listed in the previous Section 
are satisfied. Otherwise, it will be quite easy to notice 
improper behaviour of the protocol. Elimination of such a 
method may be achieved by changing the order of chunks in 
the transmitted packets. 
Detection of the second-described method, which uses a 
modular structure for the SCTP packet, may be hard to 
perform and depends on the concrete application for which 
the SCTP protocol will be utilised. Statistical analysis of the 
number of chunks in the SCTP packets can be helpful. 
Elimination of this method is possible by intentionally 
dividing each packet with more than one chunk into packets 
Steg. 
method Detection technique 
Countermeasure (proposed 
standard change) 
I1 Analysis of Verification Tags values. – 
I2 
Comparison between values of 
Maximum Inbound Streams sent by 
“normal” users (users who do not use 
steganography) and suspicious user. 
Limit possible values of Maximum 
Inbound Streams, i.e. only powers 
of 2 may be allowed. 
D1 
Comparison between values of Stream 
Sequence Number sent by “normal” 
users (users who do not use 
steganography) and suspicious user. 
For unordered transmission, Stream 
Sequence Number must be set to 0. 
D2 Checking value of Payload Stream Identifier. 
Only standardised values must be 
allowed. 
S1 Analysis of a_rwnd values and sizes of 
received chunks. – 
S2 Analysis of average number of duplicated chunks. – 
A1 Analysis of Shared Key Identifier 
values. 
Limit the number of shared keys for 
association to 1 or set one pair of 
shared keys for time slot, i.e. 10 
minutes. 
P1 Analysis of Padding Data. All bits of Padding Data must be set to 0. 
VP1 Checking the existence of IP addresses that are sent in these parameters. 
Remove these parameters. Replace 
them with new chunk type, which 
will be sent from each user’s 
address in order to add it to 
association. 
VP2 
Comparison between values of 
Heartbeat Info Parameter sent by 
normal user (user who do not use 
steganography) and suspicious user. 
Define value of Heartbeat Info 
Parameter. 
VP3 Analysis of RandomNumber. – 
VP4 
Comparison between values of 
ASCONF-Request Correlation ID sent 
by normal user (user who do not use 
steganography) and suspicious user. 
ASCONF-Request Correlation ID 
must be a sequence number. 
VP5 Analysis of Padding Data. All bits of Padding Data must be set to 0. 
with smaller numbers of chunks, but this may have negative 
effects on packet delay variation. 
C. Hybrid method 
If the number of intentionally omitted chunks is kept to a 
reasonable level, then detection of both proposed methods is 
difficult, and statistical analysis of the frequency of moving 
acknowledged TSNs may be helpful. 
Elimination of the first method is possible by a 
specialised intermediate node that will be responsible for 
detection and the dropping of chunks that have already been 
acknowledged by the receiver. 
Elimination of the second method is harder because the 
steganogram is sent before the FT chunk. 
D. Inter-protocol SCTP-based method 
It is worth noting that steganographic methods that utilise 
multi-homing are generally harder to detect than single-
homing ones. This is because, detecting covert 
communications requires observing the traffic on several 
different communication paths. 
The resistance to the detection of methods proposed in 
Section 3 depends on how future typical SCTP 
implementations will behave. If alternative paths for 
retransmitted chunks often change, then the proposed 
steganographic method that utilises multi-homing will be 
harder to detect. However, if retransmitted chunks are sent 
through only one alternative path, then any other behaviour 
will be treated as an anomaly. Thus, the requirement that 
retransmitted chunks should be sent through only one 
alternative path should be enclosed in the SCTP standard. 
Whatever the implementation, statistical analysis of NIC 
addresses used for retransmitted chunks may help to detect 
hidden communications. Elimination of proposed 
steganographic methods is possible by changing source and 
destination addresses of randomly chosen packets that 
contain retransmitted chunks. 
 
VI. IMPLEMENTATION 
We decided to implement multi-streaming based 
steganographic methods to present practical aspects to 
SCTP-based steganography. This method was chosen 
because of the following reasons: 
- The method has high steganographic bandwidth (one 
of the highest among the methods presented in this 
paper), 
- The method is hard to detect (if it is used in 
appropriate applications), 
- The method is potentially hard to eliminate. 
 
Moreover, this method is easy to apply when the Linux 
operating system is used, and it can be implemented using 
the socket API for SCTP (high level programming) [13, 15], 
which provides access to new features of SCTP (including 
multi-streaming). However, other operating systems may 
require more sophisticated solutions. If an operating system 
is not using an FCFS scheduler, then the TSN numbers for 
chunks may not be assigned in the sequence of the send() 
function calls. For these cases, implementations may need to 
be done at a lower level. 
The aim of the implemented MSD (Multi-streaming 
Steganographic Downloader) application is to 
simultaneously download several files from the server, and 
each file is downloaded within a different stream. 
The most important part of the MSD is the multi-
streaming based steganographic module. This module 
allows utilisation of all available SCTP streams, and allows 
for the setting of the size of the chunk groups, which are 
used to encode and decode hidden bits. The process of 
sending steganograms can be divided into three phases: 
• Issuing the starting sequence. 
• Sending the size of the used chunk groups. 
• Sending the length of the steganogram and the 
steganogram itself. 
 
A. Phase 1: Issuing the starting sequence 
The beginning of sending the steganogram is indicated by 
the starting sequence (the sequence of chunks from all 
streams in decreasing order of the streams’ identifiers). For 
example, if five streams are used (five files are 
downloaded), and the identifiers of the streams are 0, 1, 2, 3, 
and 4, then the start sequence is five chunks, sent one by 
one, within streams 4, 3, 2, 1 and 0. The starting sequence is 
not sent before the steganogram is transmitted. 
B. Phase 2: Sending the size of the chunk groups 
After the starting sequence, the size of the chunk groups, 
which are used to encode and decode the hidden bits, is sent. 
This size is defined by four subsequent chunks (an even 
identifier of the stream within which a chunk is sent means 
binary “0”, and an odd identifier means binary “1”). 
C. Phase 3: Sending the length of the steganogram and the 
steganogram 
After establishment of the size of the chunk groups, the 
groups are used to code the length of the steganogram and 
the steganogram to be transmitted. The procedure of 
choosing subsequent groups of chunks that are to be sent is 
as follows: 
1. All possible groups of chunks are sorted in 
increasing order. 
2. Binary sequences of  elements (n denotes 
the number of streams, and k denotes the size of the 
chunk groups) are consecutively assigned to sorted 
chunk groups in lexicographical order. 
3. If there are chunk groups without an assigned 
sequence, then sequences of  
elements, starting from sequence of zeros, are 
assigned to them. 
 
VII. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY 
The implementations described for the multi-streaming 
based method were used to carry out an experiment. The 
objective was to choose an optimal size for the chunk 
groups, to convey the steganogram in the shortest time 
(using as few chunks as possible). 
The number of chunks that must be sent to deliver a 
steganogram using a fixed number of streams may be 
different for various sizes of chunk groups used to code and 
decode hidden bits. Although the maximal bandwidth of this 
method does not depend on the size of the chunk groups, the 
lower bound of the bandwidth is different for various 
groups. The greater the lower bound of the bandwidth is, the 
greater is the guaranteed steganographic bandwidth. This 
relationship leads to the premise that groups for which the 
lower bound of the bandwidth is the greatest (Eq. (3-2)) will 
give the best results. The truth of this premise was checked 
in an experiment. 
One of the most important aspects of this experiment is to 
choose a representative group of messages that can be sent 
as a steganogram. We decided that such a group is a list of 
words SOWPODS that is used in most Scrabble 
tournaments [16]. The list contains 267,751 words with 
lengths between two and fifteen letters [17]. Words were 
written with capital letters using the char type variable in the 
C programming language. 
In the experiment, two cases were examined. In the 
former, untapped bits (bits that are not bits of a steganogram 
but that are sent within the last group of chunks that 
conveys a hidden message) are included, and, in the latter, 
untapped bits are not included. Examples of both cases is 
presented in Fig. 13. 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Untapped bits example 
 
The length of the steganogram is 20 bits. Groups 
containing 4 chunks and 8 bits can be hidden in each group 
(in a case when 4 streams are used). Then, the last group 
(group #3) contains 4 bits of steganogram and 4 untapped 
bits. If untapped bits are included, then the number of the 
chunks needed to convey the steganogram is equal to the 
product of the sent groups and the length of a single group 
(in the example in Fig. 13 the result is 3·4=12 chunks). If 
untapped bits are not included, then the quotient of untapped 
bits and the lower bound of the steganographic bandwidth 
(Eq. (3-2)) is subtracted from the sent chunks (in the 
example in Fig. 13, the result is 
 chunks). Note 
that this case is an artificial case because untapped bits are 
indeed transmitted. The only objective of introducing this 
case is to help to draw correct conclusions. 
In Fig. 14, a process of computation of measure used to 
show experimental results was presented. It is the number of 
words sent using a minimal number of chunks from among 
all transmitted words for the specified size of group and the 
specified number of streams.  
 
Length of chunk’s group used to convey steganogram 1 2 3
Number of words sent with minimal number of chunks 0 3 1
Number of words sent with minimal number of chunks among all
analyzed words (%)
0% 100% 33,3%
Word
Number of chunks
needed to send word
for group of 1-chunk 
length
Number of chunks
needed to send word
for group of 2-chunk 
length
Number of chunks
needed to send word
for group of 3-chunk 
length
Minimum
DOG 20 16 18 16
ELECTRICITY 71 60 60 60
SUMMER 43 32 36 32
 
Figure 14. Process of calculation of measure used to express 
experimental results 
 
In the example presented in Fig. 14, three streams are 
used. This example shows calculation of the measure for 
three words (“DOG”, “ELECTRICITY”, and “SUMMER”) 
and three sizes of groups (1, 2, and 3 chunks). In the first 
step (1), the method checks how many chunks must be 
transmitted to convey each word as a steganogram, 
considering the size of each group. Moreover, the minimum 
number of chunks needed to send each word is computed, 
considering the sizes of the groups that we are concerned 
with. In the second step (2), the number of words sent using 
the minimal number of chunks is calculated for each size of 
chunk group. This value (expressed as a percentage) is used 
to compare experimental results. 
The experiment was conducted for a number of streams 
between 2 and 15 and for sizes of chunk groups between 1 
and 10. There was no need to consider more sizes of groups 
because steganograms used for experiments are short (the 
longest word has 15 letters, which equals to 120 bits). 
 
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The results achieved in experiments are presented in Fig. 
15-17. There are results for three chosen numbers of streams 
(2, 5 and 9). These cases allow formulating complete 
conclusions. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
including untapped bits 100 100 33,7 100 20,1 33,7 15,7 100 15,2 20,1
not including untapped bits 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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Figure 15. Experimental result achieved for 2 streams 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
including untapped bits 0,8 10,5 6,5 39,0 17,5 19,4 48,7 31,3 9,3 9,9
not including untapped bits 0,0 0,6 0,0 6,6 7,5 19,3 0,0 14,9 23,2 32,1
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Figure 16. Experimental result achieved for 5 streams 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
including untapped bits 26,0 23,8 21,9 21,1 52,1 27,0 15,6 15,7 12,3 10,0
not including untapped bits 0,3 1,1 0,9 10,0 83,1 2,3 2,7 0,1 0,0 19,0
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Figure 17. Experimental result achieved for 9 streams 
 
The results for the case when 2 streams are used show 
that regardless of the size of the group, the same number of 
chunks is needed to send each steganogram if untapped bits 
are not included (Fig. 15). This result arises because the 
lower bound of the bandwidth and the maximum bandwidth 
are equal (Eqs. (3-1) and (3-2)). If untapped bits are 
included, then some steganograms are sent using more 
chunks than others. There is no difference between 
including and not including untapped bits only for chunk 
groups of sizes of 1, 2, 4 and 8. This similarity is caused by 
the fact that the length of each word used in the experiment 
is a multiple of 8 bits (each letter is written using 8 bits) 
and, in single groups of sizes of 1, 2, 4, 8 chunks, 1, 2, 4 and 
8 hidden bits are transmitted, respectively. Results presented 
for the case when 2 streams are used (Fig. 15) are parallel to 
results for cases when the number of streams is any power 
of 2.  
If the number of streams is a power of 2 (in the form of 
, where p is a natural number) and the steganogram is 
hidden using groups of size of k, then  bits 
are hidden in a single group. To send as few chunks as 
possible to transmit a steganogram, a chunk group size of 1 
should be used. If the size of the group is greater, then the 
number of chunks that must be sent to convey the 
steganogram may be greater. 
When 5 streams are used (Fig. 16) and untapped bits are 
not included, the best result is achieved for groups with a 
size of 10 (32.1%). This result is mainly caused by the fact 
that the lower bound of the bandwidth for this group is the 
greatest of all examined groups (2.3 bits/chunk). If untapped 
bits are included, the best result is achieved for a group of 
size of 7 (48.7%). The lower bound of the bandwidth is also 
high for this group (2.28 bits/chunk). This fact arises 
because of the many untapped bits in the case of a group 
size of 10. The lower bound of the bandwidth for this group 
is 2.3 bits/chunk; so, in a single group, 23 hidden bits are 
transmitted, and the lengths of the words are multiples of 8. 
When 9 streams are used (Fig. 17), the best results for 
both cases are achieved for group with 5 chunks (52.1% 
when untapped bits are included, 83.1% when untapped bits 
are not included). It is worth noting that all groups of size 
greater than 5 have a greater lower bound of bandwidth. 
This result is caused mainly by two factors. The first factor 
is that there is a bigger influence of untapped bits on groups 
with a size greater than 5. The second factor is the increased 
probability of sending more bits than those that arise from 
the lower bound of bandwidth for groups with a smaller size 
(i.e., it is easier to fit a shorter sequence of bits among the 
bits of a steganogram). 
The results for cases when 5 and 9 streams are used show 
that it is worthwhile to calculate the optimal size of a chunk 
group that is used to convey each steganogram, to send as 
few chunks as possible. The choice of the group for which 
the lower bound of the bandwidth is the greatest may not get 
the best result. Furthermore, the experimental results for 
cases with 5 and 9 streams show that only about 50% of the 
words are sent using a minimal number of chunks for the 
best group in the experiment. However, it is necessary to 
realise that analogous experiments for steganograms that are 
not English words can give different results. 
The experimental results achieved show that only for 
cases when the number of streams is a power of 2 can the 
optimal size of chunk group required to send a steganogram, 
using as few chunks as possible be defined. For other 
numbers of streams, it is necessary to calculate the optimal 
group size for each steganogram. 
 
IX. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we proposed nineteen different 
steganographic methods that can be used in the SCTP 
protocol. The analysis presented in this paper takes into 
account all information about hiding possibilities for SCTP 
and points out possible countermeasures. All of these 
methods may lead to confidential information leakage and 
should be treated as a threat to network security. Many of 
them may be evaded by changing the SCTP standard – 
where it is possible, certain improvements were proposed.  
For SCTP multi-streaming based steganographic 
methods, an experiment was performed using a developed 
application named MSD (Multi-streaming Steganographic 
Downloader). The experiment’s main objective was to 
choose the optimal size for chunk groups to convey 
steganograms (English words) in the shortest time (using as 
few chunks as possible). The experimental results achieved 
proved that only for cases when the number of streams is a 
power of 2 can the optimal size of a chunk group to send a 
steganogram, using as few chunks as possible, be defined. 
For other numbers of streams, it is worthwhile to calculate 
the optimal group size for each steganogram. 
Presented in this paper is a complete analysis on 
information hiding in the SCTP, and, as a result, this paper 
can be treated as a “guide” when developing steganalysis 
(detection) tools. This paper also emphasises how important 
it is to further inspect other network protocols that are to be 
utilised in future networks, to avoid hidden communications 
as early as possible, ideally, still at the standards 
development stage. 
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